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Over the past ten years, California employment law has changed
profoundly. While once an employer could fire most nonunion employ-
ees for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all, employees who have
been fired now have no less than three legal theories available to chal-
lenge their dismissals.1 Moreover, at least until the California Supreme
Court's decision in Foley v. Interactive Data Corporation, 2 an employee
who prevailed on one of these theories could expect to recover substantial
damages. Verdicts in some wrongful discharge cases reached into the
millions of dollars; estimates of average verdicts ran as high as 652,100
dollars.
3
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1. For convenience, the three theories are referred to as: retaliatory discharge (discharg-
ing an employee in violation of some important public policy, as when an employee is fired in
retaliation for his refusal to participate in illegal conduct. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Rich-
field Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980)); breach of contract (firing
an employee in violation of an implied promise only to discharge with cause. See, e.g., Pugh v.
See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981), appeal after remand, 203
Cal. App. 3d 743, 250 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1988)); and bad faith discharge (breaching the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing by, in bad faith, firing an employee who has the right to
be fired only for cause. See, e.g., Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168
Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980)).
2. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
3. Gould, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Case for Arbitration, 13 EMP.
REL. L.J. 404, 405 (1987) (average total award for wrongful discharge in California from
January 1982 to February 1986 was $652,100); see also RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUS-
TICE, THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION, R-3602-
ICJ (1988) (average wrongful discharge verdict in California from 1980-1986 was $646,855)
[hereinafter RAND Study]; Copeland, The Revenge of the Fired, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 16, 1987,
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Perhaps in part responding to what employers viewed as a poten-
tially bankrupting flood of litigation,4 in Foley the California Supreme
Court rewrote the law of wrongful discharge by limiting the kinds of
damages employees can recover. The court held that while an employee
whose discharge violates an important public policy may recover tort
damages, one whose discharge merely violates an implied promise not to
discharge her without cause may recover only contract damages, even if
the employer has acted in bad faith. Refusing to follow a line of author-
ity that had developed in the courts of appeal, 5 the supreme court held
that no cause of action in tort arises even if the discharge is in violation of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
How important is Foley? Because Foley's main significance is in
changing the rules of damages that will apply to wrongful discharge
cases, the key question is, how much of a difference, in dollars, will the
switch from tort to contract make? Is it enough to stem the tide of
wrongful discharge filings, or will the pace of litigation continue
unabated?
I. The Foley Decision
Daniel Foley had been employed by Interactive Data Corporation
for over six and one-half years when he was fired.6 Claiming he was fired
because he had informed his employer that his immediate supervisor was
being investigated by the FBI for embezzlement, Foley sued. 7 He alleged
causes of action based on each of the available wrongful discharge theo-
ries. First, he alleged that Interactive Data had fired him in retaliation
for informing on his supervisor, in violation of public policies that en-
courage such reports.8 Second, he alleged that the company, by its ac-
tions during his years of employment and by the adoption of specific
personnel policies, implicitly had promised not to fire him without cause,
at 46, 47 (average jury award for wrongful discharge over seven year period in California was
$582,000).
4. Thus, in rejecting tort liability for bad faith firings, the court emphasized the need for
predictability about the cost of contractual relationships, Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 683, 765 P.2d at
389, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227, and cites Gould, supra note 3, for the proposition that - '[t]he cost
of lawsuits..., as measured by jury awards and settlements, has also increased geometrically
and is beginning to draw concern from the business community.' " Id. at 696 n.33, 765 P.2d at
398 n.33, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38 n.33.
5. Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986); Cleary
v. American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
6. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 663, 765 P.2d at 375, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
7. Id. at 664, 765 P.2d at 375, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
8. Id. at 665, 765 P.2d at 376, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
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and that his dismissal violated that implied contract. 9 Finally, Foley al-
leged that his discharge was in bad faith, establishing a tortious breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.I° The trial court dismissed
Foley's complaint, and, on appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed.
The California Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Jus-
tice Lucas, reversed the Court of Appeal in part, and affirmed in part.
According to Lucas, although an employer who fires an employee in vio-
lation of an important public policy commits a tort, Foley's dismissal
violated no "substantial" public policy."I Although it is usually in the
employer's interest for employees to be forthcoming with incriminating
information about fellow workers, if an employer wishes to punish such
behavior, public policy is indifferent.' 2 Therefore, the court affirmed the
dismissal of Foley's retaliatory discharge cause of action.'
3
Foley fared better, however, on his contract claim. Rejecting an ar-
gument that contracts establishing a right to be discharged only for cause
must be in writing, the court held that Foley's allegations sufficed to al-
low his claim of an implied promise not to fire him without cause to go to
the jury. 14 According to the complaint, during Foley's six-plus years of
employment, his superiors had repeatedly assured him that his job was
secure. He had been promoted consistently, and his salary had increased
regularly. Further, his employer had failed to follow its own written
"termination guidelines" when it dismissed him. If these facts were
proved at trial, the court held, a jury could determine that Foley's em-
ployer's conduct amounted to an implied promise not to fire him without
cause. Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing Foley's breach of
contract cause of action.' 5
According to Foley's third cause of action, however, Interactive
Data had not merely fired him without cause, they had fired him in bad
faith, violating the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Relying on a
series of California appellate court decisions that held an employer's
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was actionable in
tort, not merely in contract, 16 Foley sought punitive damages for his em-
9. Id. at 671, 765 P.2d at 380, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
10. Id. at 682, 765 P.2d at 389, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
11. Id. at 670, 765 P.2d at 379, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
12. Id. at 670-71, 765 P.2d at 380, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
13. Id. at 671, 765 P.2d at 380, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
14. Id. at 682, 765 P.2d at 388, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
15. Id.
16. Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1170-71, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 829-
30 (1986); Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 260-62, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860, 865-
67 (1985); Crosier v. United Parcel Serv., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 1137, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361, 364
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ployer's bad faith, and damages for the emotional distress the discharge
had caused him.
Chief Justice Lucas rejected Foley's claim. According to the Chief
Justice, while every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, the purpose of the covenant is to secure the parties'
rights under the contract, not to effectuate any broader public policies.'
7
Therefore, in ordinary cases, the covenant is a part of the law of con-
tracts, not a part of the law of torts, and when the covenant is broken, a
breach of contract action-and not a tort suit-is the appropriate rem-
edy. While special cases may exist when public policies are so thor-
oughly intertwined with the performance of contracts that a breach of
the covenant will give rise to a cause of action in tort (insurance con-
tracts, for example), employment contracts are ordinary. 18 Contract
remedies are available to enforce employment contracts, but that is all, at
least until the legislature chooses to act.' 9 Therefore, the court affirmed
the trial court's dismissal of Foley's cause of action for tortious breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
20
Justices Broussard, Kaufman, and Mosk dissented from the court's
refusal to allow tort damages for breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in wrongful discharge cases. 2 1 Each argued, in essence,
that the relationship between employer and employee is as "special" as
the relationship between insurer and insured. Employees, like insureds,
contract for more than economic advantage; they seek security. 22 Em-
ployees' vulnerability and dependence create the potential for abuse, and
contract damages cannot make them whole when that abuse occurs.
23
Therefore, if a tort remedy is required when an insurer breaches in bad
faith, it also is required when an employer maliciously and arbitrarily
discharges an employee.
24
(1983); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 455-56, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722,
729 (1980).
17. 47 Cal. 3d at 690, 765 P.2d at 394, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
18. Id. at 692-93, 765 P.2d at 395-96, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 233-34.
19. Id. at 700, 765 P.2d at 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
20. Id.
21. Justice Mosk also dissented from the court's holding that Foley had failed to state a
cause of action for retaliatory discharge. According to Justice Mosk, public policy clearly
favors employees reporting the presence of an embezzler to their employers, and, therefore, he
would have held that Foley's complaint stated a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. Id.
at 724, 765 P.2d at 418, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
22. Id. at 709, 719, 765 P.2d at 407, 415, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 245, 253.
23. Id. at 718, 765 P.2d at 415, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
24. Id. at 719, 765 P.2d at 415, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
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II. The Facts of Wrongful Discharge
In The Facts of Wrongful Discharge,25 we described the results of a
study of 223 California wrongful discharge cases decided between Janu-
ary, 1979 and May, 1987. In that study, we concluded that selective
reports of landmark verdicts, haphazardly reported surveys, and anecdo-
tal evidence had combined to present a misleading picture of wrongful
discharge litigation. While certain types of wrongful discharge cases in-
deed present an alarming risk of liability, in ordinary cases, the risk is
also ordinary.26 Further, by avoiding retaliation against employees who
exercise their statutory rights, and by regularizing the personnel process
to minimize arbitrariness and bad faith, employers could bring their lia-
bility exposure within acceptable limits.2 7
Since publication of The Facts of Wrongful Discharge, the database
has grown to include all cases reported in Jury Verdicts Weekly between
January, 1979 and December, 1988, as well as the published California
wrongful discharge opinions for the same period, for a total of 326 cases.
These data provide a sound basis for an appraisal of Foley's effects.28
A. Before Foley: A Baseline
Tables One and Two provide a baseline against which the effect of
Foley can be measured:
25. Los Angeles Daily Journal, Nov. 20, 1987 (Rep. No. 87-22), at 1, reprinted in 4 THE
LAB. LAW. 257 (1988).
26. Id. at 11.
27. Id. at 10-11.
28. Jury Verdicts Weekly is published by Kenneth Raymond and Jury Verdicts Weekly,
Inc. Although Jury Verdicts Weekly relies on lawyers' self-reports, local jury verdict reporters
generally contain a fairly representative, unbiased collection of cases. See Daniels, Civil Juries,
Jury Verdict Reporters and the Going Rate (prepared for the 1986 meeting of the Law and
Society Association, May 29-June 1, 1986).
For each case in the sample, over 20 variables were recorded, including all of the plain-
tiffs' causes of action, the factual basis for each claim, the result, the result on appeal, general,
special and punitive damages awarded, the plaintiff's age, race, and sex, the size and type of
company, the length and nature of the plaintiff's employment, and the amount and type of the
plaintiff's compensation.
November 1989]
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Table One
Total Awards in California Wrongful Discharge Cases:
1979-1988
Average Median (1) Expected (2)
Award Award Award
All Wrongful Discharge Cases $452,570 $133,700 $317,686
Retaliation 579,974 215,000 434,980
Breach of Contract 193,898 100,000 109,594
Bad Faith 426,929 150,000 333,304
(1) The median award is, simply, the middle award: half of the jury awards
in the sample are larger than the median, half are smaller.
(2) The expected award is an average of the awards in all of the cases in the
sample, including defense verdicts.
As Table One shows, the extraordinary numbers bandied about in
the wrongful discharge debate before Foley were misleading. The aver-
age award when plaintiffs won indeed exceeded 450,000 dollars. But not
all plaintiffs won, and even when they did, the landmark verdicts that
drove up the average awards were few and far between. A more accurate
picture of wrongful discharge awards might have been this: More than
half the plaintiffs in litigated wrongful discharge cases lost outright, 29
and among those who won, half won less than 135,000 dollars.
Reports of astronomically high average awards also were misleading
because they ignored the fact that awards in wrongful discharge cases
varied widely according to the legal theory underlying the employee's
case. Thus, the average award in cases in which the employer's actions
violated an important public policy, or were in bad faith, were over twice
as large as the average award when the discharge was simply a breach of
a promise not to fire without cause.
The difference between the awards in retaliation and bad faith cases,
on the one hand, and contract cases on the other, can be explained very
simply. Punitive damages cannot be recovered in contract cases; neither,
as a rule, can damages for emotional distress. As Table Two shows, if
punitive damage awards were eliminated, the average award in wrongful
discharge cases would have dropped by over half, from 579,974 dollars in
retaliation cases, for example, to 271,090 dollars. At the same time, the
difference in compensatory damage awards should not be underesti-
mated: average compensatory damage awards in retaliation and bad
faith cases were about fifty percent greater than those in breach of con-
tract cases. Because the chief effect of the decision in Foley is to limit
29. Los Angeles Daily Journal, supra note 25, at 8.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41
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Table Two
































plaintiffs in bad faith cases to contract damages, these figures are critical
to understanding Foley's significance.
III. Retaliatory Discharge After Foley: "Important"
Public Policies
Foley offered the court an opportunity to limit the cause of action
for retaliatory discharge substantially. The court of appeal, after all, had
rejected Foley's claim because it believed employees should be able to
establish a cause of action for retaliatory discharge only when their em-
ployer has discharged them in violation of public policies derived from
specific statutes or constitutional provisions, and not from nonlegislative
(that is, judicial) sources. 30 The state supreme court could have followed
suit, but chose not to address that point. 31 Instead, the court rejected
Foley's claim because the policy he asserted, whatever its source, simply
was not public at all. The public, in the court's view, has no interest in
encouraging employees to inform on their fellow employees. 32
In this regard, Foley is an extremely narrow opinion, almost sui
generis. An examination of wrongful discharge verdicts and reported
cases over the past two years reveals only three cases in which Foley
30. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 662, 765 P.2d 373, 374, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 212 (1988).
31. Id. at 669, 765 P.2d at 379, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 217. The court did, however, emphasize
that the public policy on which an employee relies must be "fundamental," "firmly estab-
lished," and "substantial." Id. at 670 n.ll, 765 P.2d at 380 n.ll, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 218 n.l1.
32. Id. at 671, 765 P.2d at 380, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
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might have barred recovery. 33 Yet, while the court passed over the op-
portunity to narrow the retaliatory discharge cause of action to legisla-
tively declared public policies, two footnotes in the opinion may lay the
groundwork for later restrictions.
In these two footnotes, Chief Justice Lucas seems to suggest a test
for whether a discharge violates public policy that derives from the rule
that contracts for an illegal purpose will not be enforced. Thus, in foot-
note seven, the opinion draws an analogy between declaring a contract
unenforceable if it is for an illegal purpose, and vindicating the public
interest by refusing to allow employers to require acts contrary to public
policy as a condition of employment. 34 Then, in footnote twelve, the
opinion demonstrates the lack of a public interest on the facts in Foley by
noting that nothing would prevent an employer from making it an ex-
press condition of employment that one worker should not inform on
another.35 Is the court suggesting, with these two footnotes, a new test
for the violation of an important public policy-perhaps if the employer
legally could contract for the employee to perform a certain act, it does
not violate any important public policy if she fires an employee who re-
fuses to perform that act?
If this sort of test is what the court has in mind, it may portend a
narrowing of the retaliation cause of action. Although no California
cases come to mind in which this test would make a difference, cases
have arisen in other jurisdictions in which it might. For example, in
Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co., an employee stated a claim for re-
taliatory discharge when the employer fired the employee because he re-
fused to lobby against legislation the employer opposed.36 The Third
Circuit held that the first amendment of the United States Constitution
established an important public policy of protecting the right to form and
express opinions, and that the employer's acts violated that important
public policy. The test hinted at in Foley, however, would come to a
different result. Surely, the employer would have been free to hire the
employee to lobby, and to fire him if he did not do so effectively, without
the contract having been declared illegal. Thus, although the court in
Foley passed up the opportunity to narrow retaliatory discharge immedi-
33. Lung v. Wells Fargo, 32 Jury Verdicts Weekly no. 50, at 10 (Dec. 9, 1988); Satterlee
v. Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 32 Jury Verdicts Weekly no. 41, at 7 (Oct. 7, 1988); Schwartz v.
Louisiana Pacific Corp. 32 Jury Verdicts Weekly no. 7, at 14 (Feb. 12, 1988).
34. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 667 n.7, 765 P.2d at 377 n.7, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 215 n.7.
35. Id. at 670 n.12, 765 P.2d at 380 n.12, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 218 n.12.
36. 721 F.2d 894, 900 (3d Cir. 1983).
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ately, it may have provided the groundwork for a more restrictive ap-
proach in the future.
IV. Breach of an Implied Promise After Foley:
Beyond Pugh and Cleary
Although the principle that the course of conduct between an em-
ployer and an employee may give rise to an implicit promise only to fire
for cause had been widely accepted by the courts of appeal before Fo-
ley,37 Foley is the first supreme court decision to endorse it expressly.
Beyond simply endorsing the notion of implied contracts, the terms on
which the court allowed Foley's case to go to the jury actually may have
made it easier for employees to prove an implied contract.
Until Foley, the terms on which an implied contract could be estab-
lished were defined largely by the case in which the principle was first
recognized, Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.38 According to Pugh, a number
of factors are relevant in determining whether an implied promise not to
discharge without cause existed: the employer's personnel policies or
practices, the duration of the employee's service, the employee's work
record, the employer's assurances of continued employment, and indus-
try practices.39 Because the plaintiff in Pugh had alleged that during
thirty-two years of employment his work had never been criticized di-
rectly, that he had been assured his performance was adequate, and that
company officials had stated the company did not discharge administra-
tive personnel without cause, he made out a case for the jury.40
Foley arguably liberalized the terms on which an implied contract
will be allowed to go to the jury in two ways. First, although Pugh was a
landmark in establishing a cause of action for breach of an implied con-
tract, the court's emphasis on the length of Pugh's service as determining
the existence of an implied contract created uncertainty for plaintiffs who
followed. How long must one have been employed for the contract to be
implied? Thirty-two years, as in Pugh? Eighteen, as in Cleary v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc.,41 a case on which Pugh expressly relied? Foley eased
this uncertainty by explaining the purpose of the duration requirement.
37. See Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 681-82, 765 P.2d 388, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 226 (cases cited
therein).
38. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981), appeal after remand, 203 Cal. App.
3d 743, 250 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1988). See also Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App.
3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980) (longevity of the employee's service and express policy of the
employer may establish an implied promise not to be discharged without good cause).
39. Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925-26.
40. Id. at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927.
41. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
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According to Foley, no fixed length of employment is necessary; rather,
the totality of the circumstances must be examined. 42 Because the im-
plied contract derives from conduct by the employer that creates an ex-
pectation of continued employment, employees simply must be employed
long enough for such conduct to occur. 43 In Foley, six years was long
enough; in another case, depending on the employer's conduct, a year or
even a day might suffice.
Second, according to Pugh, the employer's personnel policies were
but one factor among many to be examined in determining whether an
implied contract exists. Foley, by contrast, suggests that such policies are
determinative, that an employer who does not follow its own written per-
sonnel procedures may be liable for breach of an employment contract.
44
Although several courts of appeal had treated personnel manuals as cre-
ating binding obligations, 45 the supreme court's express endorsement of
this approach nonetheless is important.
V. Bad Faith After Foley: From Tort to Contract
Usually, when a party to a contract fails to perform, she is liable for
the economic losses that were foreseeable when the contract was formed,
and that is all. No matter that her breach may have been malicious, no
matter that it may have caused the other party to the contract great in-
convenience and worry: Contract damages are limited to economic
losses, lest too great a burden be placed on the world of commerce,
where, after all, breach of contract is an economic fact of life.
In some contracts, however, deliberate breach is not acceptable. Be-
ginning with a series of cases involving insurance contracts, the Califor-
nia courts have recognized that in the context of these contracts,
deliberate breach may in fact be so unacceptable that punitive damages
may be made available to deter deliberate breaches. 46 Thus, in an insur-
ance contract, once the insured has suffered a loss and seeks coverage,
denying the insured the benefits she deserves without any reasonable jus-
42. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 681, 765 P.2d 373, 388, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 226 (1988).
43. Id., 765 P.2d at 387-88, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 225-26.
44. Id., 765 P.2d at 388, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
45. See, e.g., Robinson v. Hewlett-Packard Corp., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1108, 1123, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 591, 599 (1986) ("[A]n implied-in-fact promise.., not to terminate any of its employees
without good cause .. .is reflected [in the employer's personnel manual].").
46. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 820, 598 P.2d 452, 457, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 482, 487 (1979) (In the insurance context, the principal purpose of punitive damage
awards is "to deter acts deemed socially unacceptable and, consequently to discourage the
perpetuation of objectionable corporate policies.").
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tification is more than a breach of contract, it is a tort.47 An insured who
is harmed by such a bad faith breach may recover damages to compen-
sate for her economic losses, and for the emotional distress she suffers as
a result of the breach.48 Further, she can also recover punitive damages,
if she can prove malice.4 9
In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the supreme court had hinted
broadly that employment contracts might be as "special" as insurance
contracts.50 That hint sufficed for the courts of appeal, who soon thereaf-
ter held that when an employer breaches an employment contract in bad
faith, it is a tort, and tort damages are appropriate.51 Foley rejected that
view, finding that employment is primarily a contractual, economic rela-
tionship, to which the ordinary rules of contract law apply. If an em-
ployer breaches, in good faith or bad, its liability is to be measured by the
rules applicable in contract cases, not by the law of torts.
Eliminating tort damages in bad faith cases will affect the size of
wrongful discharge awards drastically simply by eliminating punitive
damage awards. Until Foley, the average punitive damages award in bad
faith cases had been 407,691 dollars, and punitive damages were awarded
in forty-three percent of the cases in our sample in which plaintiffs pre-
vailed. If punitive damage awards are eliminated from the sample, the
average award in bad faith cases drops by nearly forty percent, from
426,929 dollars to 252,859 dollars.
The opinion in Foley, however, did more than eliminate punitive
damages awards. It also changed the rules that apply to compensatory
damages, primarily by eliminating, or at least apparently eliminating,5 2
damages for emotional distress. Although Foley expressly reserved the
question of the appropriate measure of damages for breach of an employ-
47. Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 460-61, 521 P.2d 1103, 1108-09,
113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 716-17 (1974); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 574, 510 P.2d
1032, 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485 (1973).
48. Gruenberg, 9 Cal. 3d at 580-81, 510 P.2d at 1041-42, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 489-90.
49. Silberg, 11 Cal. 3d at 462, 521 P.2d at 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
50. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 179 n.12, 610 P.2d 1330, 1337 n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 846 n.12
(1980).
51. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 456, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722,
729-30 (1980).
52. In fact, Chief Justice Lucas's opinion carefully reserves the issue of whether emo-
tional distress damages are recoverable for breach of an employment contract: "We need not
here resolve questions concerning the measure of damages in a wrongful discharge action
based on breach of contract." Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 682 n.24, 765 P.2d at 388 n.24, 254 Cal.
Rptr. at 226 n.24. While agreeing that the issue was not before the court, Justice Broussard, in
his dissent, argued that emotional distress damages would be available, at least in some cases.
Id. at 701-02, 765 P.2d at 402-03, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 240-41.
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ment contract, emotional distress damages are not generally available in
contract cases.
53
It is difficult to measure the effect of eliminating emotional distress
damages precisely, because jury verdicts in wrongful discharge cases usu-
ally are reported as lump sums, without distinguishing between damages
for economic loss and emotional distress damages. A rough estimate can
be garnered, however, from a number of sources. First, there are cases in
the sample in which the employee prevailed only on a breach of contract
theory. Because Foley limits the damages in wrongful discharge cases
(other than retaliation cases) to contract damages, the awards in these
routine breach of employment contract cases would provide a good pic-
ture of future wrongful discharge verdicts, if there were enough of them.
Unfortunately, there have been very few of these routine breach of
employment contract cases, and, therefore, it is risky to generalize from
them alone. Jury reports, however, do sometimes describe what portion
of the verdict was attributable to economic losses, and reports of jury
verdicts in Jury Verdicts Weekly generally list the plaintiff's claimed eco-
nomic losses, even when it is not clear whether those losses are reflected
in the final award. Table Three, taking all these data together, makes a
fair estimate of what jury awards in nonretaliation cases will look like
after Foley.
According to the data contained in Table Three, although Foley will
reduce the average compensatory damage award in nonretaliation,
wrongful discharge cases substantially, significant amounts of money will
still be at stake. Currently, emotional distress damages account for be-
tween a quarter and a third of the total compensatory damages, on the
average; in some cases, emotional distress awards account for as much as
sixty percent to eighty percent of the award. Thus, one would expect the
elimination of emotional distress damages to reduce the average award
by approximately twenty-five percent to thirty-three percent.54
Oddly, however, the data seem to suggest that the median award
will not be greatly affected by Foley; in fact, it may increase. Thus, Table
Two shows that the median award for bad faith cases and contract cases
before Foley was the same, 100,000 dollars. And, a review of the cases
where it is possible to separate the economic and noneconomic losses
53. Dryden v. Tri-Valley Growers, 65 Cal. App. 3d 990, 999, 135 Cal. Rptr. 720, 726
(1977); Westwater v. Grace Church, 140 Cal. 339, 342, 73 P. 1055, 1056 (1903).
54. Thus, in Table Two, where the compensatory awards in bad faith cases and contract
cases are juxtaposed, compensatory damages in contract cases average 23% lower than in bad
faith cases. In verdicts when economic losses and emotional distress damages have been re-
ported separately, emotional distress awards in bad faith cases have accounted for 36% of the
damages, on the average.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41
HeinOnline -- 41 Hastings L.J. 142 1989-1990
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE AFTER FOLEY
Table Three
Bad Faith Cases Before and After Foley
Before Foley After Foley (1) After Foley (2)
Punitive Damages
Average Award: $407,691 0 0
Median Award: 100,000 0 0
Compensatory Damages
Average Award: $252,859 $252,859 $190,000
Median Award: 100,000 100,000 100,000
Total Damages
Average Award: $426,929 $252,859 $190,000
Median Award: 150,000 100,000 120,000
(1) The figures in this column assume that the only change made by Foley is the
elimination of punitive damages, and that in a future case, the court will allow
recovery of emotional distress damages for breach of an employment contract.
(2) The figures in this column assume that Foley has eliminated both punitive
and emotional distress damages. These figures are not precise; rather, they are
an extrapolation from data from a number of different sources.
suggests that the median economic loss in bad faith cases over the last
two years has been around 125,000 dollars.
These figures, of course, are not definitive; the number of pure con-
tract cases before Foley was very small, and, most likely, economic losses
are reported separately only in those cases in which they are high. None-
theless, the data are suggestive: The elimination of emotional distress
damages will lower the average award significantly, because, like the
elimination of punitive damage awards, its most obvious effect will be to
eliminate the occasional landmark verdict.5 5 At the same time, the me-
dian award may actually increase, because only cases where a substantial
economic loss has been sustained will be filed.
Thus, while the reduction in the average wrongful discharge verdict
no doubt will be impressive, the risk of liability for employers may still be
significant. For example, in bad faith cases in which it was possible to
determine the economic damages claimed and awarded, plaintiffs in
55. The elimination of the occasional, very high emotional distress award will affect the
average more than the median because these landmark verdicts have tended to occur in cases
when the economic losses are already high. Thus, removing the emotional distress award low-
ers the average award, while leaving the median award unaffected. For example, the highest
emotional distress award over the last two years was $500,000, in a case in which the plaintiff
had also suffered $252,400 in economic losses. Gardner v. Charles Schwab, 32 Jury Verdicts
Weekly (Jury Verdicts Weekly, Inc.) no. 12, at 7 (March 18, 1988). Removing a $500,000
award from the sample affects the average award tremendously, but because the economic
losses alone are greater than the median, the median does not change.
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wrongful discharge cases claimed an average of 334,724 dollars in eco-
nomic losses, and were awarded, on the average, 174,321 dollars.
VI. Defusing Wrongful Discharge
Studies of the much-discussed litigation "explosion" have estab-
lished that some types of litigation are more "explosive" than others.
"Explosive" cases have the potential to generate occasional extraordina-
rily high verdicts sending the average verdict soaring, attracting publicity
and, probably, generating more suits of that kind. Until Foley, bad faith
discharge cases were explosive. While most winning plaintiffs in bad
faith cases recovered moderate awards, the availability of punitive dam-
ages and, to a lesser extent, emotional distress damages, made it possible
for juries occasionally to express their extreme disapproval of an em-
ployer's actions with a landmark verdict. 56
Foley has defused bad faith by restricting plaintiffs to contract dam-
ages. Because punitive damages and emotional distress damages are not
available, contract damages lack the explosive potential of tort awards.
Without punitive and emotional distress damages, the jury's hands are
tied. Thus, while only two verdicts in breach of implied promise cases
have exceeded 300,000 dollars in the past nine years, twenty percent of
all bad faith cases resolved in the plaintiff's favor during the same period
resulted in awards over 300,000 dollars, and eight awards exceeded
1,000,000 dollars.
From the defendant's perspective, limiting damages to proven eco-
nomic losses limits the jury's reach into the employer's deep pocket; from
the plaintiff's view, it shackles the jury's conscience. Cases, of course,
will come along in which the economic losses are substantial, but even
then, the damages will be more predictable because the amount of loss
will turn on the evidence, not on the jury's subjective judgment.
So, what is to be expected from this kinder and gentler wrongful
discharge litigation? Although well-placed observers differ as to whether
Foley has resulted in an immediate decrease in wrongful discharge fil-
ings, 57 it is inevitable that Foley will reduce the rate of wrongful dis-
56. For instance, a 32-year-old waitress alleged that she was fired because she filed a
worker's compensation claim when she contracted a staphylococcal infection as a result of
being required by her employer to walk through raw sewage. She introduced evidence of $300
in special damages. The jury's verdict: $40,000 in general (emotional distress) damages,
$1,500,000 in punitive damages (reduced by the trial court to $1,000,000). Bailey v. Food-
maker, Inc., 30 Jury Verdicts Weekly (Jury Verdicts Weekly, Inc.) no. 43, at 1 (Oct. 24, 1986).
57. The predictions of academics and practitioners in the field are surveyed in Bureau of
National Affairs, Daily Lab. Rep., Jan. 4, 1989, and in Wrongful Discharge Cases after Foley,
Inside Litigation, Feb. 1989, at 1.
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charge litigation significantly.5 8 Foley left as many questions unanswered
as it addressed, and it will take time and litigation to answer those ques-
tions. But when the dust settles, Foley may reduce the average award in
bad faith cases by sixty-five percent or more, and a reduction of that size
undoubtedly will reduce dramatically the number of cases that are
brought. 59
Wrongful discharge cases, after all, are contingent fee cases. Even
before Foley, plaintiffs' attorneys frequently did not make their expenses
back, according to a RAND study,60 but at least the risk of undercom-
pensation was offset by the chance of a landmark verdict. After Foley,
that chance is gone. Even if lawyers are willing to take cases with such
reduced prospects, the changes produced by Foley may make employees
themselves unwilling to pursue a wrongful discharge claim, because the
emotional distress or punitive damages award that usually pays the law-
yer is gone.
VII. Making the Most of Foley
Although the loss of the tort cause of action in bad faith cases is
clearly a setback, there are a number of avenues employees' lawyers may
be able to pursue to offset Foley's effects. Following Justice Broussard's
58. Suits based on retaliation will, of course, continue; they may even increase because of
the supreme court's reaffirmation of its commitment to that cause of action. But retaliation
cases are a small part of wrongful discharge litigation. In our sample, they constituted only
14% of the cases. Bad faith cases, by contrast, made up 44% of the sample.
59. The RAND Study mentioned earlier clearly confirms that eliminating tort damages
in bad faith cases will reduce markedly the frequency of litigation. By comparing the rate of
litigation in jurisdictions where no exceptions are recognized to the rule of at-will employment
to the rate in jurisdictions where one or more exceptions are recognized, the authors of the
RAND Study come to a remarkable conclusion: Litigation rates in jurisdictions that recognize
only implied contract causes of action are only marginally higher than litigation rates in juris-
dictions that recognize no exceptions to the at-will doctrine at all. RAND Study, supra note 3,
at 17. In at-will jurisdictions, the RAND Study reported 1.3 court trials per one million em-
ployees. In jurisdictions recognizing only implied contract causes of action, they reported 2.2
court trials per one million employees. In jurisdictions recognizing a cause of action in tort for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, they reported 8.8 trials per one
million employees. Thus, according to these figures, eliminating tort damages in bad faith
cases may reduce the rate of litigation by as much as 75%.
60. RAND Study, supra note 3, at 40. As Table Three shows, the average jury verdict in
bad faith cases won by plaintiffs before Foley was $540,899; the projected average award after
Foley is $190,000. Because most plaintiffs' attorneys in wrongful discharge cases work for a
contingency fee of 40%, the average attorney's fee would be, respectively, $216,000 before
Foley; $76,000 after: a difference of $140,000. And while a potential $76,000 fee retains con-
siderable allure, this estimate is based on the average award, which may be misleadingly high,
and does not take into account the number of plaintiffs who lose outright.
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broad hint,61 they may argue that damages in employment contract cases
should include an award for emotional distress. Unfortunately, the pre-
cedent supporting such a position is thin. The cases which Justice Brous-
sard cites as supporting recovery are unusual cases; in each, the subject of
the contract was highly personal, and the facts were such that an in-
dependent tort action easily could have been maintained, thus providing
an alternative explanation for the award of emotional distress damages. 62
Indeed, in the only California case to address the issue, the supreme
court held that damages for emotional distress are too remote a conse-
quence to be recoverable in a wrongful discharge case. 63
More promising is the fact that most bad faith cases involve some
kind of employer wrongdoing that is arguably tortious in and of itself, so
that an independent tort may be pleaded in addition to the wrongful dis-
charge cause of action, resurrecting the hope of punitive and emotional
distress damages. Looking at the factual bases of wrongful discharge
cases, in over half of the cases there is some form of bad faith conduct on
the defendant's part, ranging from pretextual firings as a cover up for
personal dislike to deliberate attempts to deprive the employee of bene-
fits. When illicit motives like these are present, creative attorneys will
61. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 701-02, 765 P.2d 373, 402, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 240 (1988) (Broussard, J., dissenting).
62. Thus, Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 3d 207, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1980) and Ross v.
Forest Lawn Memorial Park, 153 Cal. App. 3d 988, 203 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1984), involved negli-
gence in the handling of a corpse or in the conduct of a funeral. Negligence in the handling of
a corpse that results in emotional harm to a close relative has always been actionable in tort.
Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 382, 334 N.E.2d 590, 592, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638, 641-42 (1975);
W. PROSSER, TORTS 58-59 (4th ed. 1971). In fact, in Ross, the plaintiff pleaded her case in
tort, not contract. Ross, 153 Cal. App. 3d at 992, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 471. Windeler v. Scheers
Jewelers, 8 Cal. App. 3d 844, 88 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1970) involved the negligent loss of wedding
rings by a bailee, and the case has been found to hold that damages for emotional distress may
be available for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of injury to property.
Again, the tort (negligent injury to property), not the breach of contract, can explain the re-
sult. Wynn v. Monterey Club, 111 Cal. App. 3d 789, 168 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1980), in which a
husband recovered damages for the emotional distress he suffered when a gaming club
breached its promise not to allow his wife to gamble, appears to be purely a contract case.
Because the club's negligence directly affected the marital relationship, however, it is not far
afield from similar tort cases. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616
P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980) (psychiatrist liable to husband for negligent infliction of
emotional distress because his negligent diagnosis of wife as syphilitic was directed at the mari-
tal relationship, foreseeably and necessarily affecting the husband).
63. See, e.g., Westwater v. Grace Church, 140 Cal. 339, 73 P. 1055 (1903) (damages for
injury to feelings are too remote to be recovered in a breach of contract suit for wrongful
discharge); see also, Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 147 Cal. App. 3d
1071, 1081 n.4, 195 Cal. Rptr. 576, 582 n.4 ("It has long been established" that damages for
injury to feelings or to the employee's health are not recoverable in a breach of contract action
for wrongful discharge.).
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find an independent tort. Indeed, even before Foley, pleading an in-
dependent cause of action in tort was a common practice in wrongful
discharge cases; in the sample, an independent tort cause of action was
alleged in seventy percent of the bad faith and breach of contract cases.
64
While pleading an independent tort cause of action may open the
back door to exactly the punitive and emotional distress damages Foley
foreclosed, it opens the door only a crack. Independent tort claims are
frequently dismissed before trial, at least when the gravamen of the case
is clearly wrongful discharge. The most frequently alleged independent
tort, intentional infliction of emotional distress, is difficult to establish,
because intent and outrageous conduct must be shown. 65 Further, recent
cases have suggested that emotional distress may be classified as an in-
jury compensable through the worker's compensation system, which may
result in preempting both intentional infliction of emotional distress and
negligent infliction of emotional distress, the second most popular in-
dependent tort theory.66 Finally, when plaintiffs have gotten to the jury
on an independent tort theory, recoveries have been modest at best.
67
The most likely response to Foley, therefore, will be a change in the
kind of plaintiffs whose cases are brought. When emotional distress
damages and punitive damages were in the picture, what made a good
wrongful discharge case was the employer's behavior. If liability could
be established, and if the conduct was egregious, the damages could be
trusted to the jury's generosity. Foley changes the emphasis from the
employer's behavior to the employee's loss, by creating an incentive to
64. The most popular independent torts were intentional infliction of emotional distress
and negligent infliction of emotional distress, which together were alleged as independent torts
in 45% of the cases in our sample. That, however, does not exhaust the creativity of the
plaintiff's bar. Misrepresentation and defamation were well represented (11%), and inten-
tional interference with contract, invasion of privacy, breach of fiduciary relationship, and
even conversion also made appearances.
65. See, e.g., Trerice v. Blue Cross of Cal., 209 Cal. App. 3d 878, 257 Cal. Rptr. 338
(1989) (employer's conduct in discharging employee was not, as a matter of law, outrageous;
no issue of fact existed for the jury). That is not to say, however, that it is impossible. See
Rulon-Miller v. International Business Mach. Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 255, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 524, 535 (1984) (affirming an award of damages for emotional distress).
66. Giorgi v. Verdugo Hills Hosp., 210 Cal. App. 3d 252, 265, 258 Cal. Rptr. 426, 431
(1989) (separate intentional infliction of emotional distress claim barred by Worker's Compen-
sation); Shoemaker v. Myers, 204 Cal. App. 3d 40, 237 Cal. Rptr. 686, rev. granted, 740 P.2d
404, 239 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1987) (same); contra Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 876 F.2d 718
(9th Cir. 1989) (applying California law) (proof of physical injury critical to determining liabil-
ity for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress).
67. In intentional infliction of emotional distress cases, for example, the median award
has been $49,000, the average only $59,623, and in only 9% of the cases were punitive dam-
ages awarded according to our sample.
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accept only cases in which evidence of substantial economic loss can be
developed.
68
If it were true, as some have argued, that wrongful discharge suits
have always primarily benefitted displaced executives and middle manag-
ers, Foley's emphasis on economic losses would mean little more than a
change in strategy. With the right plaintiff-one with a relatively high
salary, no equivalent employment available as a substitute, and substan-
tial savings to support him through the litigation 69-Foley simply re-
quires that proving economic losses be given a higher priority in the
development of the case. With the benefit of expert economists, proof of
substantial economic losses is not complicated.
Wrongful discharge litigation, however, has not just been a golden
parachute for middle managers. In both our sample and in the RAND
study, only half of the plaintiffs were middle managers or executives. In
the RAND study, only eighteen percent qualified as "highly paid execu-
tives. ' ' 70 In fact, the protection afforded to employees by the wrongful
discharge cause of action reached every strata of the workplace.
More importantly, wrongful discharge litigation has conferred im-
portant benefits on ordinary workers beyond simply the chance to sue
their employers. There can be little doubt that the threat of liability for
wrongful discharge has caused employers to adopt procedures to make
employee terminations more fair and less arbitrary.7' Fear of liability is
a powerful motivator, and that fear led employers, frequently on the ad-
vice of counsel, to devise elaborate personnel systems to reduce the
chance of illegal action, and, hence, the risk of liability.
Perhaps the most important question to ask about Foley is whether
employers will eliminate the personnel systems they had adopted under
the pressure of wrongful discharge litigation, now that the pressure is off?.
68. The elimination of emotional distress damages affects disproportionately employees
whose economic losses are small. While the largest emotional distress awards have tended to
occur in cases where the economic loss is also large, in smaller cases, emotional distress awards
account for a much greater proportion of the award. Thus, in cases in our sample where the
total award is less than the median award, emotional distress damages accounted for 42% of
the award, on average. For cases above the median, the emotional distress award accounted
for, on the average, 25% of the total award.
69. These characteristics are determined by the requirement that a discharged employee
accept an equivalent job if one is available in order to mitigate his losses, and that whatever
employment he actually accepts will reduce the damages he can recover. Thus, to maximize
the damage award, the plaintiff must be able to show that no equivalent employment was
available, and must be financially secure enough to avoid taking any less suitable job.
70. RAND Study, supra note 3, at 20.
71. See, e.g., Lubin, Legal Challenges Force Firms to Revamp Ways They Dismiss Work-
ers, Wall. St. J., Sept. 13, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
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The answer may be yes. By suggesting that liability for wrongful dis-
charge, other than retaliatory discharge, is simply a matter of contract
law, Foley effectively encourages employers to forego the expense of per-
sonnel procedures and simply inform its employees that they are em-
ployed at-will, forestalling the obligation to fire only for cause.
To do so, however, would be shortsighted, for a number of reasons.
The Foley opinion is extremely vague in describing how the obligation to
fire only with cause arises. The opinion's only guidance is to look to the
"totality of the circumstances, ' 72 and if the totality of the circumstances
are to be the guide, disclaimers and the like may not be effective in cir-
cumventing the obligation. 73 More important, retaliation is still actiona-
ble in tort, and a personnel system that avoids the risk of liability for
retaliatory discharge will probably justify its cost. Finally, the cases that
have resulted in landmark verdicts have been cases where the employer's
actions are, in a word, malicious: they have involved employers who
have retaliated against their employees in an unconscionable fashion, or
who have fired people out of spite or pretextually, or who have fired peo-
ple to rob them of commissions or pension benefits. 74 When this sort of
wrongdoing is present, juries will find a way to sanction it. Thus, in the
long run, legal incentives for sound personnel procedures continue to ex-
ist, even after Foley. 75
VIII. The Danger of Stereotypes
The law of wrongful discharge developed in large part because of a
perceived need to limit employers' abusive exercise of the power to fire at
will.76 In those terms, Foley amounts to a decision that such abuses can
be curbed by allowing employees to contract for job security and enforc-
72. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 681, 765 P.2d 373, 388, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 226 (1988).
73. See, e.g., McLain v. Great American Ins., 208 Cal. App. 3d 1476, 256 Cal. Rptr. 863
(1989) (Although the application form the employee filled out expressly stated that he could be
terminated with or without cause, the employer's actions before and after hiring the employee
modified the employment contract, giving rise to an implied promise not to fire without
cause.).
74. Lanouette v. Ciba-Geigy, 31 Jury Verdicts Weekly (Jury Verdicts Weekly, Inc.) no.
26, at 18 (June 26, 1987); Bailey v. Foodmaker, Inc., 30 Jury Verdicts Weekly (Jury Verdicts
Weekly, Inc.) no. 43, at I (Oct. 24, 1986); Lisec v. United Airlines, 30 Jury Verdicts Weekly
(Jury Verdicts Weekly, Inc.) no. 26, at 15 (June 27, 1986).
75. Further, sound personnel procedures are in the employer's economic self-interest,
contributing to productivity and morale. Levine, Judicial Backpedaling: Putting the Brakes on
California's Law of Wrongful Termination, 20 PAC. L.J. 993, 1049 n.202 (1989).
76. Cf Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Ex-
ercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404, 1405 (1967) (employer abuse exists and
this unsatisfactory trend could be stemmed by developments in tort law).
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ing those contracts. In theory, the knowledge that liability for the
worker's economic losses will follow a breach, combined with the em-
ployer's self-interest in retaining good employees, will limit the em-
ployer's power without the devastating effect unpredictable tort damage
awards have on commercial stability.
As the Foley dissenters point out, the majority's analysis depends on
a number of empirical propositions about the bargaining power of em-
ployees, the relationship between employment and financial security, and
the availability of substitute employment that are debatable, to say the
least. 77 It also depends on a number of questionable assumptions about
wrongful discharge litigation.
Perhaps the most troubling of these is the assumption that "bad
faith" or abusive discharges are rare, because rational employers do not
undercut their own economic interests by maliciously discharging good
employees. According to this view, most wrongful discharge cases are
fundamentally disputes over the existence of good cause, and allegations
of bad faith are trumped up attempts to reach into the employer's deep
pocket. The data, however, tell a different story. Well over half of the
time, plaintiffs who prove they were fired without cause also successfully
establish bad faith on the employer's part.
How is this to be explained? Surely, prejudiced juries cannot ac-
count for all these cases. 78 Are employers, then, irrational? Justice
Broussard attributes it to mere shortsightedness: In the short run, an
employer may actually gain by firing an experienced, good employee
(who makes a high wage) and hiring an inexperienced, good employee
(whose wages and benefits are lower). Because traditional contract dam-
ages do not require the employer to pay for all the harm his actions
cause, they often do not exceed the short-term profits generated by the
discharge. Therefore, firing the employee without cause is risk-free. If
the employee sues and recovers damages, the employer loses very little.
If the employee does not sue, or if he loses, the employer realizes a quick
profit (although he would lose out in the long run if his firing practices
were known to prospective employees).
79
While Justice Broussard is correct to observe that contract damages
do not necessarily provide a sufficient incentive to avoid arbitrary con-
77. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 708-09, 765 P.2d at 407-08, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 245-46 (Broussard,
J., dissenting); id. at 718-19, 765 P.2d at 414-15, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 252-53 (Kaufman, J.,
dissenting).
78. But see Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 970
(1984) (arguing that juries cannot determine employers' motives accurately).
79. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 707, 765 P.2d at 406, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 244 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
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duct by employers,80 there is a more fundamental flaw in the majority's
conclusion that economic self-interest is an adequate hedge against bad
faith. The majority's conclusion is the product of yet another common,
but incorrect, assumption about wrongful discharge: that the usual
wrongful discharge plaintiff is a highly paid executive or middle manager
who deals more or less directly with his employer, and whose job per-
formance directly affects the employer's financial well-being. In fact,
about half of all wrongful discharge plaintiffs are not managers fired by
their employers, they are workers fired by their managers. Those manag-
ers may act to further the employer's economic well-being, but they may
also act out of narrow self-interest, spite, or personal animosity.
Thus, arbitrariness and bad faith creep into personnel decisions be-
cause the economic consequences of losing a good employee fall on the
employer, not on the particular supervisor who makes the decision to
fire. Employment, thus, is not a simple economic arrangement between
two parties, in which economic self-interest will ordinarily protect the
interests of each. In many instances it is, rather, a relationship between
an individual with power in an organization, and nothing at stake-the
supervisor-and an individual without power, and everything at stake-
the employee. In this context, simple economic rationality will not deter
bad faith.
Even acknowledging that the adverse economic consequences of bad
faith are an inadequate deterrent, however, tort liability might still be a
bad idea. Given that mistakes in personnel matters are inevitable, the
risk of tort liability might impose an intolerable cost on employers, if tort
judgments are as unpredictable and outrageous as the Foley court be-
lieved them to be. But again, the data suggest that tort liability for
wrongful discharge is neither outrageous nor unpredictable. In most
cases, liability is both moderate and predictable. 81
80. For a similar analysis of the inadequacies of contract damages, see Traynor, Bad
Faith Breach of a Commercial Contract: A Comment on the Seaman's Case, Bus. L. NEws,
Fall 1984, at 1.
81. As evidence for the unpredictability of wrongful discharge litigation, the Foley court
refers to an article in which it is claimed that awards in California wrongful discharge suits
"actually exceeded settlement demands by 187%." Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 696 n.33, 765 P.2d at
398 n.33, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 237 n.33 (citing Gould, supra note 3, at 405-06). It is not clear why
it should be surprising that awards should exceed demands; indeed, one would expect demands
to be less than awards, since a settlement avoids both the risk and the cost of a trial.
The RAND Study in fact suggests that settlement practices in wrongful discharge cases
are actually quite rational. Settlement demands "appear to be roughly consistent with reason-
able expectations about probable awards," and while offers appear to be unrelated to expected
awards, "they are in the range of what the median plaintiff can expect to gain after post-trial
adjustments and deductions for legal expenses." RAND Study, supra note 3, at 42-43.
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Wrongful discharge litigation always has labored under a stereotype
engendered by the publicity attendant on a handful of landmark verdicts.
The stereotypical plaintiff is a highly paid executive or manager; the ster-
eotypical issue, whether cause existed for the discharge; the stereotypical
result, an unpredictable, high-stakes lottery. The stereotype is not en-
tirely unfounded. 82 Yet for every case that fits the stereotype, another
involves an ordinary worker, injured by arbitrary and malicious acts,
whose recovery is moderate and predictable. Unfortunately, the decision
in Foley seems more responsive to the stereotype than to the facts of
wrongful discharge.
Conclusion
After Foley, wrongful discharge plaintiffs only will be able to recover
punitive damages and damages for emotional distress if they can show
that their discharge violated an important public policy, or that the em-
ployer committed some other, independent tort. As a result, the risk of
liability to which employers are exposed has been reduced dramatically,
perhaps by as much as two thirds. Although the many ambiguities and
uncertainties left by the opinion will keep litigation going for a while,
there can be little doubt that the expected substantial reduction in awards
will lower the rate of wrongful discharge litigation significantly.
This decrease in litigation, however, will affect some types of plain-
tiffs more than others. Highly paid executives and employees with
unique skills will still find suit worthwhile. Ordinary workers, however,
may not. Yet, ordinary, nonunion workers were frequent plaintiffs in
wrongful discharge litigation, and the threat of liability impelled many
employers to develop safeguards against arbitrariness in employment de-
cisions. Because the court's opinion in Foley is so colored by the impres-
sion created by a handful of highly visible, landmark verdicts, the effect
the decision will have on ordinary wrongful discharge cases, and on the
safeguards against abusive discharge inspired by the threat of liability,
unfortunately is ignored.
82. Indeed, many of the plaintiffs in the most celebrated cases-Pugh and Cleary, for
example-would fit this stereotype.
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